The U.S. in the Middle East - A Background
The origins of a long off and on again relationship between the U.S. and the Middle East begins in the late 1700s just after American Independence. U.S. trade ships were constantly in danger of pirates in the Middle East enroute to trading destinations in the Mediterranean Sea. After several armed clashes, treaties were made and for the most part, American ships were allowed to pass. With the exception of American religious missions to spread Christianity, there was little American involvement in the region.
It wasn't until after WWI that the U.S. really began to keep an eye on the Middle East, but even then, the U.S. was content to let France and Britain be the main watchdogs there since both countries had a long standing presence there. After WWII, Britain and France were in dire condition due to so much loss during the war. Since America emerged as one of two world super powers (the other being the Soviet Union, or Russia), it had to make sure that a Soviet invasion did not take place in the Middle East, which it feared. During this period of the Cold War, any interest that the U.S. had in the Middle revolved around Soviet expansion there.
The U.S. focused on three major countries in the region: Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. In 1950 the Truman administration committed the U.S. to the defense of Saudi Arabia and toward this end it upgraded the facilities at the military base of Dahran, turning it into one of the most important American bases. The U.S. also moved to strengthen its ties with the conservative forces in Iran. Reza Shah Pahlavi, a pro-Western by education and conviction, became Washington’s man in this country. He actively cooperated with the Americans to transform his country from a non-aligned country into a close ally of the U.S. As a result, the Americans stepped up their military and economic aid to Iran. They also helped in the restructuring of the Iranian army and security.
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Washington’s breakthrough in Iran occurred in 1953 when they acted jointly with the British to overthrow Mossadaq, the democratically elected prime minister. Mossadaq was a nationalist who was not satisfied with the share his country got from the oil concession that the British enjoyed. After difficult negotiations between the two parties ended in failure, Mossadaq decided to nationalize the oil industry. His overthrow was the result of a coordinated action by the CIA and British intelligence services and led to the reimposition of the autocratic rule of the Shah. This operation was the first large-scale American intervention in the Middle East and had far-reaching consequences. It confirmed Iran’s position as an anti-communist frontline state and close ally or the U.S. It further provided the U.S. with a centrally important strategic foothold on the Soviet border. It also marked the end of British monopoly over Iranian oil and a severe blow to the British presence in the region in general. In October 1953 John Foster Dulles commissioned Herbert Hoover Jr., a petroleum advisor and son of a former president, to solve the oil dispute in Iran and above all make sure American companies acquired a share in the Iranian oil industry.
The U.S. did not engage in any prolonged, bloody encounters with Muslim states and societies. Apart from the current occupation of Iraq, the U.S. never ruled over Arab and Muslim lands, or developed Europe’s complex imperial system. In the first part of the 20th century, the U.S. developed dynamic and cordial relations with Arabs and Muslims who viewed America as a progressive power compared to European colonial countries. Even after it became a superpower, the U.S. was much less constrained by colonial or historical antagonisms that we find in the case of the European powers. For the U.S., political and economic concerns have always been the driving force behind Washington’s Middle Eastern policy. Although the religious and cultural challenge of Islam continues to seize the imagination of many people in the U.S., it is the security and strategic implications of Islam that resonate in the minds of Americans.
During much of the 1950s and 1960s the U.S. hoped to construct an alliance of Islamic states with sufficient power and prestige to counterbalance “godless communists” and the secular nationalist forces as represented by Nasser. During the 1960s, one of the reasons behind the deterioration of relations between the U.S. and Nasser was the encouragement given by the Americans to the Saudis in order to sponsor a holy Islamic alliance which would bring together all conservative regimes in the region to isolate Egypt and the radical secularist regimes in the Arab world. At the time Islam was seen to serve Western interests while Arab secular nationalism was considered to be dangerous as an objective ally of communism.
The U.S. perception of the Middle East situation and the nature of the threat saw a radical shift in the 1970s largely because of the explosion of Islamic politics on the scene. Regional events such as the 1967 war between the Arabs and Israel brought about a discredit of secular nationalism in the region and allowed radical Islamist ideologies to move to the central stage.
It was the Iranian revolution of 1978 which contributed more than any other factor in bringing the so-called “Islamic threat” to the attention of ordinary Americans. Accustomed to seeing their country as the model of democracy and generosity, the Americans were shocked when they heard Ayatullah Khomeini call it “the great Satan”. Never before had the American administration been confronted to this type of irrational and uncompromising attitudes on the part of the Iranian Mullahs. By holding 52 American hostages for more than one year, Khomeini’s Iran inflicted daily humiliation on the U.S., underlying at the same time their unfamiliar sense of powerlessness. Iran really became a national obsession for the Americans, and the image of Islam for them had acquired its most negative aspect. As with Arab nationalism of the 1950s, labels such as “fanatical” or “terrorist” were now applied to the Iranian Islamic revolution. As the specter of communism was retreating it was now Islamism which rose to prominence as the number one security threat. Worse than communism this new threat aroused the fears of a clash of civilizations which would bring about a direct confrontation between Islam and the West.
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The Iranian revolution resulted in real damage to U.S. presence and interests in the Middle East. The loss of the Shah of Iran, a staunch American ally whose role was to police the Gulf region, was deeply felt in Washington. More than that the whole security system the U.S. built around conservative countries such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies was in jeopardy now, especially after Khomeini denounced these regimes as “un-Islamic”, or characterized their Islam as “American Islam”.
Video that explains a lot in a short amount of time, make sure you watch it.
Middle East & Terrorism
Unlike many European countries the U.S. had virtually escaped the horror of terrorism during the second world war. Now in the 80s and 90s, it became a target for terrorist actions. Perhaps the most memorable terrorist attack before the September 11 events, was the 1993 World Trade Center bombing which deepened Americans’ fear about the security threats associated with Islamists. This incident did considerable damage to the Muslim image and presence in the United States. The Muslim community in the U.S. became an easy target for racism and political discrimination.
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The World Trade Center bombing had broader implications for U.S. foreign policy. For President Clinton who was working for a positive accommodationist policy toward Islam, violent actions like this one were a real setback. In the Middle East some regimes, particularly Israel and Egypt, sought to capitalize on American fears to escalate their repression of local Islamist groups. In the U.S. itself the advocates of the clash-of-civilizations hypothesis used it to recommend tougher policies toward Islamists. Therefore, the World Trade Center blast of 1993 provided hard-liners both inside the U.S. and abroad with the opportunity to lobby the Clinton administration to come up with a harsher policy toward the Islamists.
After September 11, 2001

Within hours of the September 11 terror attacks on New York and Washington D.C., American commentators were already comparing the event to a “new Pearl Harbor.” The 60th anniversary of that transformative event was coming up later in the year, and had been the subject of a major Hollywood movie over the summer. The comparison of September 11 with Pearl Harbor was natural because both were surprise attacks that killed many Americans, but most interesting about it was its implication: that an age of innocence and isolation had passed, and that American invulnerability was gone. Just as was the case after the Japanese attack (and again in a different way when the Soviet Union launched the Sputnik satellite some 16 years later), September 11 seemed fated to change radically and permanently the degree to which, and the way in which, the United States engaged with the rest of the world.
Perhaps the most obvious affect on U.S. foreign policy will be through the new tradeoffs that a “war on terrorism” could require. If stopping terrorism really is now the country’s top priority in the way that stopping Communism once was, competing priorities will inevitably be displaced. The new premium on Russian cooperation, for example, might make it harder or more costly for Washington to proceed with current policy plans to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, enlarge NATO, or press for human rights in Chechnya. Getting Pakistan on board might mean lifting economic sanctions, helping with debt relief, and maintaining a neutral position on Kashmir despite a warming U.S. relationship with India. The need for Chinese support makes it harder to vigorously support Taiwan, to proceed with missile defense, or to publicly criticize Beijing’s human rights practices. Perhaps most important of all will be the difficulty of securing the indispensable support of moderate Arab states like Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia; their populations could oppose cooperation with the United States so long as Washington maintains strong support for Israel and sanctions on Iraq. Just as the struggle against Communism forced the United States to downgrade other foreign policy goals—in some cases such as the promotion of democracy and human rights—any serious struggle against terrorism will have a similar impact. Other goals will not and should not be simply cast aside, but no one should think that a new and complicated campaign against terrorism will come without major opportunity costs.
On the morning of “9/11,” 19 hijackers boarded planes with the intent of hijacking them. Airplane hijackings had been a regular tactic of terrorist groups for decades, but al-Qaeda introduced a new innovation. Rather than use the hijackings to make demands and extract concessions, they used them as the world’s largest suicide bombs.
The hijackers crashed two into the World Trade Center, collapsing both buildings and a neighboring building. They crashed one into the Pentagon, and, realizing what was going on, the passengers on the fourth took control and crashed United Flight 93 into an empty field. Osama bin Laden had made good on his 23 February 1998 fatwa, “The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.” The United States reaction was not swift, but it was severe. |
War in Afghanistan

Three days later, on 14 September 2001, Bush received from Congress an “Authorization for the Use of Military Force” (AUMF), which authorized him “to use all necessary and appropriate force” not only against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, but also “in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.” This vague and ill-defined authorization has since been used to justify US deployments at least 37 times in locations including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Kenya, Philippines, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen (Weed 2006, 2). The AUMF has given three presidents broad powers, but it was originally written to authorize the invasion of Afghanistan and the pursuit of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
The United States knew immediately that Osama bin Laden was behind 9/11 and gave the Taliban government of Afghanistan one final chance to turn him over to the US. They declined, and the United States invaded Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. The Taliban government fell on 17 December 2001.
The war in Afghanistan was not controversial and enjoyed bipartisan support. President George W. Bush (2001, par. 59) made clear in his speech to a joint session of Congress that, “any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” But while the Taliban’s harboring of terrorists was beyond dispute, the Administration’s case for war in Iraq was more controversial.
The war in Afghanistan was not controversial and enjoyed bipartisan support. President George W. Bush (2001, par. 59) made clear in his speech to a joint session of Congress that, “any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” But while the Taliban’s harboring of terrorists was beyond dispute, the Administration’s case for war in Iraq was more controversial.
War in Iraq
The Administration’s argument hinged on Saddam developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Secretary of State Colin Powell (2003, par. 15) made the case to the UN Security Council that, “the facts and Iraq’s behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.” He even had pictures to “prove” it, but we now know that his WMD programs had been defunct for many years. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was correct in its assessment that Iraq had no active nuclear program. Powell now calls that speech a “great intelligence failure” and a “blot” on his record (Breslow 2016, par. 1). Nevertheless, the Bush Administration proceeded with its war planning.
Despite Powell’s best efforts, the UNSC declined to authorize the use of force. In contrast to his father’s global coalition, Bush proceeded with a “Coalition of the Willing” made up largely of the United States, United Kingdom, Poland, and Australia. The Coalition launched airstrikes and a ground invasion on 20 March 2003, and found Saddam Hussein hiding in a hole in the ground. The war was won easily. Saddam Hussein was not loved by his people and initially US forces were “greeted as liberators,” just as Cheney had predicted (Cheney and Russert 2003, par. 4). But the fanfare was short-lived and Cheney would later be mocked for the statement.
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The American coalition installed Ambassador L. Paul Bremer as Administrator of the new “Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).” Bremer quickly disbanded the Iraqi Army and purged Iraqi society of members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party. The 424,000 members of the Iraqi Army were critical to maintaining law and order, and were generally more interested in receiving a paycheck than in loyalty to Saddam Hussein. Because of Bremer’s decision they were armed and angry, and with few job prospects in the new Iraq. The situation was similar for Baath Party members above the very lowest ranks. Bremer barred them from government, but to work in government in Saddam’s Iraq, one had to be a Baath party member. Thus, the CPA effectively fired the entire government bureaucracy. Nobody could run the electrical grid. Nobody could maintain critical infrastructure. The only people with real authority were the Americans. Many former soldiers and Baath party officials joined militias, and years later, some joined the so-called Islamic State.
The CPA wrote Iraq’s constitution with minimal input from Iraqis. Major positions were given to young Republican Party officials. The US military was asked to provide basic law and order but was not given the training to do so. Iraqi institutions were looted and destroyed. Making matters worse, the oil ministry was well-protected. The perception of American forces was dealt a crippling blow when, on 28 April 2004, 60 Minutes aired photographs of American soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, where Saddam Hussein’s regime tortured its own prisoners. These images changed the average view of the United States across Iraq.
As law and order broke down, sectarian tensions and score-settling grew. Militia groups took control of towns and sections of Baghdad. Some of these groups were supportive of the American occupation; others were bitterly opposed. The Coalition faced a growing insurgency and responded with force, which only further alienated the Iraqi people.
ISIS
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began as “al-Qaeda in Iraq,” but was expelled from the al-Qaeda network for its brutality and for its targeting of other Muslims. It grew rapidly and took over large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. By the end of 2014 ISIS controlled 34,000 square miles. This base of operations and ISIS’s skilled fighters and (stolen) American equipment put both America’s Kurdish allies, and the American-backed government in Iraq, at risk. Additionally, a series of brutal videos of ISIS members decapitating Westerners terrified the American public. The US decided it could not stand by while ISIS caused such damage and terrorized the local population. It reinserted special forces teams and advisors to assist the Kurds and the Iraqi Army in their fight against ISIS. In Syria, where Obama had long resisted American involvement, he now committed a small number of US special forces. In 2017 the new Administration increased the US presence in Syria to 2,000.
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The US began the post-Cold War era in the Middle East in an enviable position. It had widespread public and elite support. The region had never been quiet, but the coalition against Saddam Hussein had united disparate actors and there was reason to hope for future cooperation. The United States had never been entirely absent from the Middle East, but 30 years of interventions and more than 17 years of war left both America and the Middle East with countless unresolved, and perhaps unresolvable, problems.
Assignments
Assignment 1 - Website Questions
Assignment 2 - Middle East Article - You can click on the link and read it that way if you have an Internet connection at home or you may use the download option that way you can download it here and read it later.
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Assignment 3 - Middle East Map